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On the Existence of Equilibria for an n-Coalitions Game*
Hirokazu Sakane
A strategic behavior taken by many agents in a group is investi
gated. In our game model, /T-coalitions are formed by many agents.
The optimum coalition strategy is selected in accordance with a
consensus of almost each agent which belongs to the coalition,
given the other coalition's strategies. The state that almost each
agent in every coalition no longer has any insentive to change its
strategy is called equilibrium points. The purpose of this note is to
present an existence theorem of equilibrium points for the game.
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1. The Introduction
In this note, a strategic behavior taken by many agents in a group is
investigated. It is assumed in our model that n-coalitions are formed and
many agents which belong to each coalition behave in cooperation. Under
these suppositions, the following three notions must be explained to define
a game, that is, (i) a set of coalitions, (ii) a strategy set for a coalition, and
(iii) a payoff function for a coalition. First, The set of coalitions has a mean
ing of a set of players in our model. It is also called a coalition structure,
which is a partition of the set of agents. And it is fixed arbitrarily for the
whole of the note. Second, A strategy set for a coalition must be defined
besides a strategy set for an agent. It is supposed that the notion is defined
as an aggregation of strategy sets for agents which belong to the coalition.
An element of the strategy set is a strategy for the coalition. Finally, a pay
off function for a coalition is a real valued function defined on the strategy
set for the coalition, given the other coalition's strategies. A game is speci
fied by these three notion. The game is called in this note 'n-coalitions
game'. In the game, it is supposed that the optimum coalition strategy
which guarantees the maximum payoff for a coalition is selected in accor
dance with a consensus of almost each agent belonging to the coalition,
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given the other coalition's strategies. The state that almost each agent in
every coalition no longer has any insentive to change its strategy is called
equilibrium points in the n-coalitions game. The purpose of this paper is to
present an existence theorem of equilibrium points for the game.
2. The Definitions
The space of agents is a measure space (/, S, fi), where 7 is a set of
agents, is a cr-algebra of subsets of I and ^ i?+ is a countably addi
tive, nonatomic finite measure. It is supposed in our model that n-coalitions
(which are subsets of 7) are formed and each agent belongs to one of coali
tions {Ca.}^=i which satisfies the conditions Cx=7and Cx(^Crj = 0(X+
rj). That is {Cx}x= i 's a patition of 7. It is also called a coalition structure. The
coalition structure is fixed for the rest of the note. Since agents which
belong to each coalition behave in cooperation, each coalition may be
regarded as a unit of a decision maker. In a word, Cx is considered to be a
player for each A,e{l, •••, n}.
(D.I) {Cx}£=i is the set of players, which satisfies the conditions U£=i Cx=7
and Cx(^Ctj = 0Q^*r])' (The Coalition Structure).
The strategy set for agent i^I ls denoted by X(i) and it is assumed that
X(i)(ZR^. Since JT: 7 -> 7?^ is regarded as a set-valued map, the set of inte-
grable selections of X may be defined by if: = {x ^  L\\x(i) ^  X{i), fx-a.e.).
The strategy set for coalition Cx^^{I) is defined by fc^X(i)dfx := {Jc^x(i)dju
\x G if}, and an element acx of the set is called a strategy for the coalition.
(D.2) fc^X{i)d/ii: = {fc^x{i) d/u\x G if} (Xe {1, •••, n}); (The Strategy Set for a
Coalition).
It is supposed that each coalition Cx selects an element of fc^X(i)dju
which guarantees the maximum payoff for Cx, given the other coalition's
strategies (acj. • acj. A payoff function for a coalition is a real-valued func
tion defined as follows.
(D.3) Vc^ (•, (ac,, •••, acj): fc^X(i)dju R-,. (^^{1, •••. n}); (The Payoff Func
tion for a Coalition).
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The n-coalitions game is specified by the list of (D.1)~{D.3) as follows.
(D.4) (-.{ac,, ac„))}x=i); (The n-Coalitions
Game).
(D.5) The equilibrium points for the n-coalitions game is the n-tuple
(acj. •••. a*cj G (fciX(i)dju x ••• x Jc„X{i)d^) satisfing the condition
[VXe{l, •••, n), Tcx(aQ.. (aci. •••- (iCr,))='"^ac^sIc,x{i)dt. Vc^, (acv (aci. ao,))];
(The Equilibrium Points for the n-Coalitions Game).
3. The Existence of Equiiibrium Points for The n-Coalitions Game
Now, we turn to prove a theorem on the existence of equilibrium points
for the game ({Cx}£=i, {fcxX(i)dfi}l=i, {VcxO. («Ci. •••. o,c„))}x=i)
Theorem: Under the following conditions (i)~(iv), there are equilibrium
points for ({Cx}x= i- {fcx^(i)dM}x= i- i^Cx (•• (aci- ''% oo. ))}x= i).
{\) X: I satisfies the condition 3y^ L\, ||a;(f)|| £ y(i), y-a.e.],
(ii) X{i) is closed in y-a.e.,
(iii) graphiX): = {(a:(i), i)^R^xi\x{i)^X(i)} is an element of
(iv) for any A,e {1, •••, n) and any (acj. •••, ac)^{jciX{i)dix x ••• x fc„X(i)djj),
the payoff function (•, (acj, ac„))'- fcxX{i)dy. ^  R+ is quasi-concave.
Proof: Fix any A,g{1, •••, n}. Let xcx he the characteristic function. Since the
correspondence xcx-^ ^Iso satisfies the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), it is shown
that JxcxX{i)dju = fc^X(i)dju is a non-empty compact set by Theorem 2 and
4 in Aumann (1965). Moreover, it is proved that fc^X{i)dy is convex by
Lemma A in Vind (1964). The best response correspondence is defined as
follows,
(1) ax: X(i)dyx---x X(i)dp-> X(i)dy, (aQ, acj ac^:
J Ci J Cn V Cx
Tcx(«Cx' («Ci. ci'cJ) = '>'>^ac-,sfc,x{i)dK Vcx (acx- {acv <^0,))-
Fix any (acj, •••, ac„)£ jcyX(i)dy x ••• x fc„X{i)dy. An upper semi-continuity
of ax is shown by the standard method. A convexity of axiac^, acj is
obvious under the condition (iv) and the convexity of jc^_X{i)dy.. And it is
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shown by Theorem 2 and 4 in Aumann (1965) that ax(aci, • acj Is a non
empty compact set. These results are true for any {acy. ctcj^ fciXii)dfi x
•••X fc^X(i)d^ and any {l, •••, n}. Let a define as follows.
(2) a: X(i)dpx---x X(i)dM^ X(i)djux---x X(i)d/i
V Ci J Cn V Ci J Cn
(aci- •••- ^ G,) ^  (ai(aci. •••- dCnl ■■■- an(ac,, •••, acj.
The correspondense a has the same properties as ax. Therefore, by
Kakutani's fixed point theorem, there exists an element satisfing the condi
tion {a*cy, •••. a*c„) e a(aci. •••. a*c„). The element (aci. a*cj satisfies the
condition in (D.5).
4. The Concluding Remark
To search a desirable element for a coalition is not always a rational
behavior for almost each agent in the coalition. Suppose that a preference
relation for each agent f e / is represented by a utility function u{i, acy,
•••, acj : X(i) ^ R+. When each i G Cx receives a transferable utility vx{i,
aci- •••- acn) satisfing the condition Vcx(acv (acy< •••. acj) = /cxvx(i ocv
acjdjii, i compares vxii acr arid uix*(i), acy. ocj, where x* is the
strategy satisfing the condition acy, • acjdn = acx- If acv
ac„) = u(x*(i), acy, ac„) is concluded, agent i G Cx willing to stay the
coalition Cx. If it is not so, however, agent i G Cx will wish to deviate from
Cx- Such the behavioral pattern may not be analyzed by the game model.
This problem remains as a matter to be discussed further.
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